This paper argues that the deterioration of relational goods induces people to shift their expectations from relational goods to market goods. This shift is confirmed by a large body of psychology and sociology literature that discusses the issue under the heading of ‘materialism’ (see the survey by Lane 2000:ch.8). For example, poll-surveys on the values expressed by successive cohorts of college freshmen in the US show a rise from about 40% in the late 1960s to 75% in the late 1990s of those who rated “being very well off financially” as a very important personal objective (Putnam 2000:260, 272-4; Lane 2000:154-7).
A specific stream in the psychology literature adduces ample empirical evidence on two effects of the orientation to materialism. The first effect is a worse disposition to relationships, less co-operation, and a lower quality of relationships (Kasser 2000; Kasser-Ryan 2001). The second effect is described thus by Ryan-Deci’s (2001:153) survey: “people who place a strong value on wealth relative to goals such as close relationships, [and] personal growth […] should show lower well-being” (emphasis added; see also Lane 2000:143 and ch.8),[14] more depression, more anxiety, less vitality, and an even greater propensity for mental illness (see also Deci-Ryan 2000:321; Nickerson et al. 2003).[15]
Is the shift to market goods a rational choice?
All these results on deterioration and on the shift away from relational goods appear puzzling for economists, who predict that the utility dynamics of optimising agents do not point to decline unless they are forced to do so by market failures.[16] A number of questions arise: why do people not learn to relate healthily within marriage and the family? why do they not pass this knowledge and ability on to future generations? why are they so vulnerable to past experiences in relationships, so attracted to material goods? why do they not devote more time and effort to preventing the deterioration of relational goods?
These questions suggest a problem of “ rationality failure”, at least when decisions regard personal relationships. An increasing body of analysis in economics and cognitive psychology, often called ‘behavioural economics’, attempts to understand certain systematic discrepancies between the observed behaviours of individuals and their behaviours as predicted by the classical theory of rational choice (Camerer-Loewenstein 2004; Tirole 2002).[17] A popular explanation for these discrepancies refers to ‘visceral factors’ like “hunger, thirst, sexual desire, moods and emotions, physical pain, and craving”, which typically affect humans, and which induce them to deviate from rational behaviour, and hence from utility maximisation (Loewenstein 1996:272; Gifford 2002).
This explanation, in its turn, refers to psychology studies on decisions, arguing that humans follow ‘two systems of thought’: rational/analytical, which is slow, controlled, and effortful; and experiential/affective, which is intuitive, fast, emotional, and effortless. In particular, the ‘affect heuristic’ is recognised as an efficient shortcut whereby stimuli are marked with an affect drive in order to take rapid decisions and behaviours (Epstein 1994; Slovic et al. 2002; Kahneman 2003).[18]
Three different affective reactions
The experiential/affective system, rather than the rational/analytical system, characterises personalities. Hence, ‘rationality failures’ are expected to differ among people by degree. Much psychology literature, from social through developmental to clinical, has studied stylisations of the affective characterisations of people. In particular, an authoritative stream of literature called the ‘attachment approach’, initiated by Bowlby (1969) and developed by Ainsworth et al. (1978) and others, not only proposes three styles of affective characterisation, especially regarding personal relationships, but also argues that these styles originate in infancy.
In this approach, by ‘attachment’ is meant an innate system that induces the infant to seek to establish communication with her/his caregivers on whom s/he is entirely dependent for satisfaction of her/his basic needs.[19] The interaction between them reflects the caregivers’ availability and responsiveness. On this basis, the infant builds an ‘internal working model’ of relationships, i.e. expectations about the caregiver’s responsiveness, and the representation of self as (un)worthy of love and care. Neuroscientists observe that an infant’s brain is especially plastic, so that the attachment pattern may be viewed as a set of information, only partially accessible, correlated with neuronal connections (Siegel 1999, 2001).
Three main styles of attachment can be distinguished: ‘secure’, ‘preoccupied’ and ‘avoidant’, the latter two being ‘insecure’. ‘Secure’ attachment occurs when the caregivers are able to satisfy both the infant’s material and mental needs, especially the need for relatedness. Besides security in coping with external reality, the infant thus develops vitality, and the mindsight which enables her/him to understand people without the use of verbal language. Therefore, the infant’s internal working model built upon well-being in relatedness brings her/him to positive (i) expectation, (ii) feeling and understanding, (iii) consideration, (iv) and disposition to others. S/he can draw great well-being from relationships, while her/his vitality helps her/him overcome stressful events, thus to maintain the original style of attachment (this italic numbering will be maintained throughout the paper).
‘Preoccupied’ attachment occurs when the caregivers perform intrusive and incoherent emotionality, so that the infant is partially disappointed since her/his need for relatedness is unsatisfied by confused communication. The infant becomes dependent on the caregivers, short of mindsight, and anxious about new relationships. Therefore, her/his internal working model brings her/him to (i) a cautious expectation of others, i.e. mixed between unsatisfied needs and fear of disappointment, a reduced (ii) feeling and understanding, (iii) consideration, (iv) and disposition to others. S/he cannot draw significant well-being from relationships. A lack of vitality makes her/him vulnerable to stressful events, thus to maintain the original style of attachment. ‘Avoidant’ attachment occurs when the caregivers are unable adequately to feel and respond to the infant’s needs because they control emotionality in relationships.
The infant is seriously disappointed, short of understanding, and learns to control emotionality. This induces the infant to ‘solve’ her/his insecurity by building an internal working model of (i) no expectation, (ii) reduced feeling and understanding, (iii) no consideration, (iv) and a reduced disposition to others. S/he rapidly learns not to base well-being on relationships and is thus unable to appreciate positive experiences with others,[20] which reinforces the original style of attachment. Attachment styles may be maintained in adulthood by the above-mentioned stabilising mechanisms, which can be briefly reworded in economic jargon. The ‘secure’ person bases her/his prior belief on the probability of experiencing future rewarding relational goods on an ample positive information set, although acquired with incomplete awareness during infancy. Information updating is applied on a particular self-service basis: by selecting favourable close relationships, and by alleviating the effects of possible negative information through relating with others.
The ‘preoccupied’ person maintains a negative but very uncertain prior belief about relational goods, since it is based on disappointed expectations and ambiguous information. S/he updates with a negative bias, and without the ability to collect information from favourable relationships. The ‘avoidant’ person maintains a definite negative prior belief about relational goods which is constrained by the particular self-commitment to avoid updating. The attachment approach has been successfully tested for predictive power on adolescence and adulthood by using various methods (Kobak-Sceery 1988; Waters et al. 2000, and following articles; Mikulincer-Nachshon 1991; Tidwell et al. 1996; Mikulincer et al. 2001).[21]
It has also been controlled in the laboratory as dependent on relationships with the caregiver, not on the infant’s personality traits (Siegel 2001). Other tests on differentials in understanding, responsiveness, happiness, others’ positive feelings among ‘secure’, ‘preoccupied’, and ‘avoidant’ adults appear reassuring (Kafetsios-Nezleck 2002:725). Unfortunately, secure attachment is not very widespread: it seems to appear in about half of cases (Siegel 1999: 76; Kafetsios-Nezleck 2002). Psychology and economic literature provide a variety of other evidence and theoretical arguments that are consistent with the attachment approach. On the particular self-serving updating pursued by ‘secure’ and/or ‘preoccupied’ types of persons see Seidlitz et al. (1997), Diener et al. (1999:282 and 285), Morris (1999), Rabin-Schrag (1999).
On the blocked depressed condition of ‘preoccupied’ persons, see Argyle (1987:ch.2), and Lane (2000:157). On the rational choice anticipating disappointment like that of ‘avoidant’ persons, see Loomes-Sugden (1986), van Dijk et al. (2003). On the attempt to substitute for unsatisfactory personal relationships by consuming market goods see Richins (1994), Rindfleisch et al. (1997), Kasser-Ryan (2001), Kasser et al. (1995).[22] Some evidence is also provided the psychology literature that people react to person-related disappointment differently from the way in which they react to other disappointments. People in fact tend react by avoiding experiences with others, rather than persisting in their behaviour (van Dijk-Zeelenberg 2002).
The paradox explained
From the preceding sections it can be argued that significant groups of people incur a ‘rationality failure’ because they tendentially choose to reduce their expectations about relational goods with respect to market goods, but undergo detrimental effects on their well-being. The basic reason for this failure is the loss of the capacity to feel for and hence appreciate others as an unconscious reaction to inadequate primary relationships. [23]
A particular kind of self-serving updating of information hinders the adjustment of the failure. These arguments induce us to expect that a significant proportion of people experience deterioration in their well-being. But a complete explanation of the paradox should account for the decline, or at least the reduced growth, of average well-being across successive generations. A suggestion in this regard is provided by several studies in sociology and psychology: the exposure of people to the market system and to social models encourages materialistic values (Lane 1991, 2000; Kasser et al. 2004; Putnam 2000).
A notable example is television advertising, which is found to be positively related to children’s purchase requests, but also to family conflict, disappointment, and life dissatisfaction (Buijzen-Valkenburg 2003; Bybee et al. 1985). Even more worrisome is the finding that watching television during adolescence and early adulthood is significantly associated with subsequent aggressive acts against others (Johnson et al. 2002), and that violent video games have similar effects, together with a desensitisation to violence (Funk et al. 2004).
This suggestion would be unsatisfactory, especially from an economist’ point of view, if taken as the main explanation for the paradox. It is not clear, in fact, why individuals are so vulnerable to materialistic temptation, and to intolerance towards others, and why they do not learn that this drive induces them to make wrong choices. These questions on individuals’ vulnerability and on the success of the current materialistic social model can now find an answer in the previous analysis.
14 This result is confirmed even if controlled for income (Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002; Nickerson et al. 2003). Ryan and Deci (2001:153) explain this result by arguing that “placing too much priority on material goods […] can distract from foci that would yield need fulfillment”.
15 Ryan and Deci (2000) further maintain that external motivation can be internalised (i.e. perceived as emanating from the person himself), thus providing beneficial effects. Hence, external and intrinsic motivations appear complementary. However, introducing the concept of internalisation put the whole reasoning at risk of circularity.
16 Some economists suggest a coordination failure due to negative externalities from the production and consumption of market goods toward non-market goods, like environmental and relational goods. Each individual attempts to restore her/his well-being by substituting non-market goods with market goods, thus triggering a vicious circle (Hirsch 1976; Bartolini and Bonatti 2002; 2004). See also Antoci et al. (2001); Ng and Wan (1993).
17 The classical definition of rationality includes perception rationality, i.e. the ability to form and update beliefs as probability judgments according to Bayesian rules, preference rationality, i.e. the knowledge of welldefined preferences, which accurately reflect the true costs and benefits of available options, and process rationality, i.e. the ability to maximise those preferences under resources constraint (McFadden 1999).
18 The two systems for decisions can find some confirmation in neuroscience (LeDoux 1996, 2002; Rolls 2000). The ‘affect heuristics’ appears consistent with Damasio’s (1994) ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis.
19 Fagioli’s (1971) ‘theory of birth’ is an alternative to that of innate attachment and needs. He argues that at birth the infant reacts to the striking contrast between previous foetal homeostasis and the new stimuli of material reality, by making this reality non-existent in his mind, and, at the same time, by creating a psychic self which may be confirmed, developed, or disappointed by subsequent human relationships.
20 Fagioli (1971) argues that the drive to make disappointing others mentally non-existent also destroys the inner capacity for feeling, thus also disposition to others.
21 Also during adolescence the relationship with the parents may influence, usually reinforcing, the affective characterisation of individuals in a similar way to attachment during infancy (Steinberg 2001: 8-9; Nickerson and Nagle 2004).
22 “If people’s need for relatedness is substantially thwarted when they are young – Deci and Ryan (2000:249) argue – they might compensate by attempting to gain […] sense of worth by […] accumulating money or material possessions”. On the contrary, “in contexts characterised by a sense of secure relatedness […] intrinsic motivations will be more likely to flourish” (235).
23 Weinberger et al. (1979) find that ‘repressor’ individuals, i.e. those who report low anxiety but high defensiveness, are more stressed than ‘truly’ low-anxious individuals. The affective characterisation of adults is also studied by the literature on personality traits, which finds that genetics plays only a partial role, that extraversion, relation with others, trust, and emotional stability are positively correlated with SWB, while repressive defensiveness exhibits a negative correlation (Cooper et al. 1998).
By Prof. Maurizio Pugno
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